# ADR-023 — CI security + supply-chain enforcement stack

**Status:** Accepted
**Date:** 2026-05-14
**Builds on:** ADR-022 (library evaluation policy)
**Related:** ADR-006 (vertical feature packages), ADR-010 (turbo boundaries), ADR-019 (sandcastle agent orchestration), ADR-021 (release-please versioning)
**Companion guide:** `docs/guides/ci-security.md` (to be written; human reading-room)

## Context

ADR-022 codified the library-evaluation policy: at adoption time, every new
runtime dependency in a feature- or core-tier package is gated by 8 hard filters

- 3 prompts and produces a permanent trace at `docs/library-decisions/`. That
  closes the **decision** gate. It does not close the **drift** gate. Once a
  library is in the lockfile, ADR-022 has nothing to say about:

1. **CVE disclosures against the current pinned version.** A library that
   passes `pnpm audit --audit-level=moderate` clean at adoption can have a
   critical CVE published against it the next day. The trace's
   `verification-commands` snapshot goes stale silently.
2. **Supply-chain _behavior_ compromise.** The disclosed-CVE world only
   catches vulnerabilities that someone has filed. Packages with malicious
   behavior — `event-stream` (2018), `ua-parser-js` (2021), `tj-actions/changed-files`
   (2025), `xz-utils` (2024) — shipped malware that no CVE database had
   seen at the moment of compromise. CVE scanning is a lagging indicator.
3. **Maintainer-account compromise.** A trusted upstream maintainer's npm
   account gets phished. The next `1.2.4` patch publishes a malicious
   post-install script. Every consumer pulling `^1.2.0` inherits it.
   Renovate or Dependabot will happily open a bump PR.
4. **GitHub Actions supply chain.** This repo's 5 existing workflows pin
   their actions to **major-version tags** (`actions/checkout@v4`,
   `pnpm/action-setup@v4`, `googleapis/release-please-action@v4`). The
   `tj-actions/changed-files` incident demonstrated that a compromised
   maintainer can push a malicious tag and everyone pinned to `@v4`
   silently inherits it. Major-tag pinning is documented insecure.
5. **License drift.** Upstream packages occasionally relicense (Sentry
   went BSL on a major; Elasticsearch went SSPL). A `1.x → 2.x` Renovate
   PR might silently move a previously MIT-licensed dep to a copyleft or
   source-available license that violates ADR-022's filter #1.
6. **EU-residency drift.** A vendor (Sentry, PostHog, etc.) announces
   US-only changes mid-flight. The trace's `eu-residency: ok` snapshot
   becomes false; ADR-022's filter #6 has no way to detect this.

The repo's current security posture, audited 2026-05-14: **zero security
tooling**. No Dependabot config, no Renovate, no CodeQL, no Snyk, no Trivy,
no OSV-Scanner, no Socket, no gitleaks, no `pnpm audit signatures` step.
GitHub Actions are pinned to major-version tags. The 5 existing workflows
(`ci.yml`, `coverage-snapshot.yml`, `mutation-nightly.yml`, `release-please.yml`,
`sentry-pii-guard.yml`) cover functional CI, but nothing surfaces a
post-adoption supply-chain signal.

For a GDPR-bound EU-resident template that ships as agent-friendly
infrastructure, this is the load-bearing gap that ADR-022 cannot close
alone. The decision below extends ADR-022 with a continuous-validation
counterpart and adds five orthogonal layers that catch the threat surface
ADR-022's adoption-time gate doesn't see.

## Decision

Adopt a **four-pillar CI security and supply-chain enforcement stack**:
(1) Renovate-managed bumps + Action SHA pinning, (2) Socket-based
supply-chain-behavior detection, (3) continuous trace revalidation
extending ADR-022, (4) baseline GitHub-native gates (CodeQL + secret
scanning + sigstore provenance). Each pillar composes with the existing
5-gate conformance pattern from ADR-012 — layered enforcement at
declining latencies.

### 1. Renovate adoption (bumps + Action SHA pinning)

`.github/renovate.json` configures Renovate to manage all runtime + dev
dependency bumps and to SHA-pin every GitHub Action invocation:

- **npm bumps** — per-workspace package.json updates honored. Minor +
  patch bumps grouped by ecosystem cluster (e.g. one weekly PR for all
  `@sentry/*`, one for all `@opentelemetry/*`). Auto-merge enabled for
  green minor + patch PRs. Major bumps require human (or agent) review
  — see §3.
- **Dockerfile bumps** — `.sandcastle/Dockerfile`'s `node:22-bookworm-slim`
  base image gets the same treatment as npm.
- **Action SHA pinning** — `pinGitHubActionDigests` rewrites every
  `uses: <owner>/<repo>@<tag>` to `uses: <owner>/<repo>@<40-char-sha>  # <tag>`
  on first run. Subsequent Action releases produce bump PRs that update
  the SHA + the trailing comment in one diff.
- **Vulnerability alerts** stay on the GitHub-native server-side surface
  (no Dependabot bump PRs). Server-side alerts compose with Renovate
  bumps: an alert may trigger a manual Renovate `:rebase` to accelerate
  a particular bump.

Renovate over Dependabot for this repo specifically because:

- **pnpm-workspace support** is mature and per-workspace updates work
  from one config file (Dependabot requires verbose per-workspace blocks).
- **`pinGitHubActionDigests` is native** (Dependabot SHA-pinning requires
  manual config).
- **PR grouping rules** are more granular — one PR per ecosystem cluster
  instead of per-package noise.
- **Major/minor split + automerge** is one-liner config (Dependabot
  requires a separate GitHub Action for automerge).

### 2. Socket.dev integration (supply-chain _behavior_ detection)

Layered free-tier integration; no paid plan required:

- **Socket GitHub App** installed on the repo. Posts risk-score comments
  on every PR that touches `package.json` / `pnpm-lock.yaml`. Free
  for OSS use.
- **`socket-cli` CI step** in `ci.yml`'s `validate` job. Runs
  `socket-cli scan` against the lockfile and fails the job on
  configurable severity. Configuration in `.socket.json`:
  ```json
  { "issueRules": { "critical": "error", "high": "warn", "medium": "ignore" } }
  ```
  Default: critical → block the PR; lower severities → comment only.
- **Sandcastle reviewer prompt** reads Socket CI output via the GitHub
  CLI and rejects the agent slice when a `critical` finding is present.
  Adds machine-readable enforcement to the agent dispatch loop.

Socket adds a **9th hard filter** to `evaluate-library` (ADR-022's filter
set). New trace frontmatter field:

```yaml
filter-results:
  socket-risk: clean | flagged | "<finding-summary>"
```

At adoption time the skill runs `socket-cli scan <package>` and records
the result. The continuous monitor surface is §3 (trace revalidation),
which re-runs the same command on schedule.

### 3. Trace revalidation cron (ADR-022 continuous-validation counterpart)

New workflow at `.github/workflows/trace-revalidation-weekly.yml`. Runs
weekly via cron + on-demand via `workflow_dispatch`. Mirrors the cadence
shape of `mutation-nightly.yml`.

**Scope:** every approved + pre-shipped trace under `docs/library-decisions/`.
Rejection traces skipped (no signal value in re-validating an already-rejected
library).

**Action — for each in-scope trace:**

1. Read the trace's `verification-commands:` block.
2. Re-run each command, capture stdout/stderr.
3. Compare against the trace's `filter-results:` snapshot.
4. Classify divergence:
   - **Soft** — CVE count changed without crossing severity threshold;
     maintenance signal still active but downgraded one level; transitive
     dep count changed.
   - **Hard** — license changed; named-consumer no longer present;
     critical CVE disclosed; EU residency flipped to `fail`; Socket
     flag escalated to `critical`.

**Issue management:**

- **Soft divergence** appends to a single rolling **"library-trace
  dashboard" GitHub issue** kept open continuously. One issue total,
  updated each run with the latest comparison diff. Labeled
  `library-policy/dashboard`.
- **Hard divergence** opens a fresh per-dep GitHub issue labeled
  `library-policy/re-evaluation`. Title format:
  `[trace-revalidation] <package> — <reason>`. The issue body cites the
  trace path + the verification-command output + the diff.

**Auto-edit policy:** trace revalidation NEVER edits a trace file. The
re-walk needs the `evaluate-library` skill (8 filters + 3 prompts, with
agent judgement). CI catches divergence; the dispatch loop fixes it.

**Auto-dispatch policy:** `library-policy/re-evaluation` issues are
**not** auto-picked up by the dispatch loop. Human triage required.
Auto-dispatch on CI-opened issues would create a feedback loop where
the agent loop spends nights re-evaluating libraries based on rotating
CVE data. Issues are a queue; humans drain them via `pnpm work dispatch`.

**Main-CI gating policy:** hard divergence does NOT fail CI on main.
Main can keep deploying while the trace gets re-walked. Gating on main
would block release-please PRs every time a CVE drops upstream.

### 4. Baseline GitHub-native gates

- **CodeQL** at `.github/workflows/codeql.yml`. Language config
  `javascript-typescript` covers everything this repo is. Runs on push to
  main + PRs + weekly schedule. Free for public repos and on
  Pro/Team/Enterprise plans for private repos; consumers without a
  CodeQL-eligible plan get a no-op + a clear error message from GitHub.
- **`pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high`** added as one step in
  `ci.yml`'s existing `validate` job. Verifies npm sigstore attestations.
  ~40% of the registry is signed today and climbing.
- **Secret scanning — two layers:**
  - GitHub-native **push protection** (server-side, free, blocks pushes
    containing known token patterns at the GitHub edge). Consumer toggles
    in repo settings. Documented in `docs/guides/ci-security.md`.
  - **`gitleaks` pre-commit hook** wired into `.husky/pre-commit` as a
    step alongside the existing state-sync guard. Catches custom token
    patterns the GitHub allowlist doesn't know about. Local; free.

### 5. Failure-mode hierarchy

Two principles govern what blocks vs. what comments:

- **Boolean checks** (compiles, schema valid, signature verifies, secret
  present, trace file present) hard-block. They have a definite right
  answer.
- **Judgment checks** (Socket risk score, CodeQL semantic finding) are
  advisory unless severity reaches `critical` / `error`. They can have
  false positives.

Concrete table (the source of truth referenced by reviewer-prompt and
documentation):

| Gate                                                             | Layer       | Hard block?                                         |
| ---------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
| `pnpm typecheck && test && lint && conformance && coverage:diff` | CI          | Yes                                                 |
| State-sync guard                                                 | pre-commit  | Yes                                                 |
| `gitleaks` (custom patterns)                                     | pre-commit  | Yes                                                 |
| Library-trace presence check (ADR-022)                           | pre-commit  | Yes                                                 |
| GitHub native push protection                                    | server-side | Yes (GitHub edge)                                   |
| Renovate minor/patch bump PRs                                    | CI          | Auto-merge if green                                 |
| Renovate major bump PRs                                          | CI          | Block until evaluate-library re-run + trace refresh |
| Socket CI step — `critical`                                      | CI          | Yes                                                 |
| Socket CI step — `high` or below                                 | CI          | Advisory                                            |
| Socket GitHub App PR comments                                    | server-side | Advisory                                            |
| CodeQL — `error` severity                                        | CI          | Yes                                                 |
| CodeQL — `warning` / `note`                                      | CI          | Advisory                                            |
| `pnpm audit signatures` failure                                  | CI          | Yes                                                 |
| GitHub Dependabot vuln alerts                                    | server-side | Advisory (post-merge)                               |
| Trace revalidation — soft divergence                             | weekly cron | Dashboard issue                                     |
| Trace revalidation — hard divergence                             | weekly cron | Per-dep issue                                       |

### 6. Amendments to ADR-022

This ADR amends ADR-022 in three places. ADR-022 itself stays unedited
(its `Status: Accepted` is preserved for provenance); the amendments are
recorded here and the new behavior is what the implementation honors.

**§6.1 — Major-bump re-evaluation trigger.** ADR-022 §1 and §8 spoke of
"new runtime dependencies" but did not address bumps to existing deps.
When Renovate (§1 above) bumps a runtime dep in a feature- or core-tier
package and the bump crosses a semver-major boundary, the
`evaluate-library` skill re-runs against the upgraded version. Minor +
patch bumps do **not** trigger re-evaluation. The existing trace file is
updated in-place: `version`, `filter-results`, `verification-commands`,
and `last-revalidated` (new field — see §6.2) are refreshed; the original
`date` field is preserved as the adoption-provenance marker.

**§6.2 — `last-revalidated` frontmatter field.** Trace schema gains
`last-revalidated: <YYYY-MM-DD>`, set by both major-bump re-eval (§6.1)
and trace revalidation (§3). Separate from the original `date` field
which is immutable post-adoption.

**§6.3 — Socket as 9th hard filter.** ADR-022's 8 hard filters gain a
9th: `socket-risk`. Trace frontmatter's `filter-results:` block adds
`socket-risk: clean | flagged | "<finding-summary>"`. At adoption time
the `evaluate-library` skill runs `socket-cli scan <package>` as part of
the cheap-structural filter block; `critical` findings auto-reject.
Verification-commands gains the Socket scan command.

### 7. Composition with the sandcastle reviewer prompt

The reviewer prompt at `.sandcastle/reviewer.prompt.md` is extended with
two new responsibilities (bundled into the library-evaluation epic's
existing story 06, not split into a separate story):

- Read Socket CI output (via `gh run view` or PR API) and reject the
  slice if any `critical` finding is present.
- Read CodeQL findings and reject the slice if any `error` severity is
  present.

These compose with the reviewer's existing responsibilities (library-
trace presence check from ADR-022's PRD, `pnpm coverage:diff` from
ADR-020).

### 8. Template-vs-consumer framing

This stack ships as **template artifacts** that work in any consumer's
GitHub repo. Configurations (`renovate.json`, `.socket.json`, `codeql.yml`,
`trace-revalidation-weekly.yml`) are written generically:

- No project-name-specific paths.
- All workflows use `ubuntu-latest`.
- Plan-gated tools (CodeQL on private repos) include a clear error
  message when the consumer's plan doesn't cover them, rather than
  no-op-ing silently.
- `docs/guides/ci-security.md` documents what each consumer toggles
  (GitHub push protection, Socket App install, branch protection rules
  for `library-policy/re-evaluation` labels).

This template's own consumption of the stack — when it's eventually
pushed to a GitHub remote — uses the same configurations unchanged.

### 9. Amendment — SBOM release artifact (CycloneDX)

**Added:** 2026-05-20 (story `10-sbom-ci-workflow`)

`.github/workflows/release-please.yml` is amended to generate a
[CycloneDX](https://cyclonedx.org/) SBOM and attach it to every GitHub
release cut by release-please.

**Concrete step shape:**

```yaml
- name: Generate CycloneDX SBOM
  if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.releases_created == 'true' }}
  run: >
    pnpm dlx @cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm
    --output-file sbom-${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}.cdx.json
    --output-format json
    --ignore-npm-errors

- name: Attach SBOM to GitHub release
  if: ${{ steps.release.outputs.releases_created == 'true' }}
  uses: softprops/action-gh-release@b4309332981a82ec1c5618f44dd2e27cc8bfbfda # v3.0.0
  with:
    tag_name: ${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}
    files: sbom-${{ steps.release.outputs.tag_name }}.cdx.json
```

**Prerequisites** (also conditional on `releases_created == 'true'`):
`actions/checkout@v4` → `pnpm/action-setup@v4` → `actions/setup-node@v4`
→ `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`, providing the installed workspace
graph that `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` analyses.

**Rationale:**

- **Compliance surface.** Consumers pursuing SOC 2 / ISO 27001 /
  FedRAMP / EU CRA must produce an inventory of every version that
  shipped. A CycloneDX JSON SBOM attached to each GitHub release gives
  auditors a machine-readable, per-release artifact without requiring
  them to inspect or re-run the repo.
- **`pnpm dlx`, not `package.json`.** `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` is
  a release-time audit tool, not a runtime or build dependency; adding
  it to the lockfile would violate ADR-022's spirit (library evaluation
  required for runtime deps in feature/core packages). `pnpm dlx`
  fetches and discards it within the CI step.
- **`--ignore-npm-errors`.** `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` internally
  invokes `npm ls` to traverse the dependency graph. In a pnpm
  workspace, `npm ls` exits non-zero when it encounters dev-deps-of-
  dev-deps that pnpm correctly elides from the install tree; the SBOM
  content is unaffected. Without this flag the step exits 254 and
  produces no file. `--ignore-npm-errors` instructs the tool to treat
  those `npm ls` warnings as non-fatal and emit the SBOM regardless.
- **SHA-pinned action.** `softprops/action-gh-release` is pinned to a
  40-character commit SHA (`# v3.0.0` trailing comment) per §1's
  Renovate `pinGitHubActionDigests` preset. Renovate will open a bump
  PR when a newer release is available.
- **Conditional execution.** The SBOM steps run only when
  `releases_created == 'true'` — every non-release push to `main`
  skips them entirely. This keeps the workflow fast for the common case
  (release-please just updating its rolling PR).
- **Root SBOM covers all workspace packages.** Running
  `@cyclonedx/cyclonedx-npm` from the workspace root after
  `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` captures the full resolved
  dependency graph across all packages. Per-package SBOMs are out of
  scope (see story `10-sbom-ci-workflow` §Out of scope).

**Failure-mode table row** (extends §5):

| Gate                                        | Layer   | Hard block?             |
| ------------------------------------------- | ------- | ----------------------- |
| SBOM generation (`@cyclonedx/...`)          | release | Yes — release job fails |
| SBOM upload (`softprops/action-gh-release`) | release | Yes — release job fails |

SBOM absence blocks the release job; it does **not** gate main CI
(the `ci.yml` `validate` job is unaffected). This matches the
principle that release assets are part of the release job, not part
of the per-PR validation loop.

## Alternatives considered

- **Dependabot for everything instead of Renovate.** Rejected. Less
  granular monorepo handling, requires verbose per-workspace config,
  Action SHA pinning needs manual setup. Renovate's `pnpm-workspace`
  - `pinGitHubActionDigests` presets do this declaratively.
- **No bump tool, manual bumps only.** Rejected. Deps go stale; CVE
  patches land late; the named-consumer-cares-now signal becomes "who
  even remembers."
- **Paid Socket Team plan for hard PR blocks.** Rejected (default).
  Free App + self-hosted `socket-cli` in CI achieves equivalent
  enforcement at $0. Consumers who want the server-side branch-protection
  integration can upgrade per their own threat model.
- **Nightly trace revalidation instead of weekly.** Rejected. License /
  maintenance / EU-residency signals don't change daily; nightly burns
  CI minutes on noise. CVE batches publish ~weekly.
- **Auto-dispatch on `library-policy/re-evaluation` issues.** Rejected.
  Creates a feedback loop where the agent loop runs nightly re-evals on
  rotating CVE data. The issue queue stays human-triaged; the dispatch
  loop drains it on demand.
- **CI gating on `library-policy/re-evaluation` (block main).** Rejected.
  Main can keep deploying while the trace gets re-walked. CI gating
  would block release-please PRs every time a CVE drops upstream,
  conflating release flow with policy maintenance.
- **Splitting into two ADRs (CI security + ADR-022 extensions).**
  Rejected. The bump-trigger rule only makes sense once Renovate is in
  place; trace revalidation only makes sense alongside Socket; the
  failure-mode hierarchy spans both. One coherent decision, one ADR.
- **Editing ADR-022 in-place to add the bump rule + Socket filter + new
  field.** Rejected. ADR-022's `Status: Accepted` is provenance — what
  we believed when it was signed. Amendments live here in §6 and the
  implementation honors the composed picture. This is the repo's first
  amendment-style ADR; if it works, future ADR drift gets the same
  pattern.

## Consequences

**Positive**

- Closes the post-adoption rot ADR-022 cannot reach alone — CVE drift,
  supply-chain behavior compromise, license drift, EU-residency drift,
  Action supply-chain attacks.
- The trace artifact becomes continuously validated, not point-in-time.
  Approved libraries carry a `last-revalidated` freshness signal.
- Renovate's major/minor split + automerge keeps the lockfile current
  with minimal human attention while still gating real decision moments.
- Action SHA pinning closes the `tj-actions/changed-files` class of
  attack permanently.
- Layered Socket integration (App + CLI + reviewer prompt) gives
  consumers a $0 baseline that's stricter than most paid offerings'
  defaults.
- Failure-mode hierarchy is machine-readable: the sandcastle reviewer
  prompt becomes the single composable gate for agent-driven PRs.
- Template-vs-consumer framing means downstream repos inherit the
  stack on day one without per-project setup.

**Negative**

- Six new artifacts ship (`renovate.json`, `.socket.json`, `codeql.yml`,
  `trace-revalidation-weekly.yml`, `gitleaks` pre-commit step, updates
  to `ci.yml` + reviewer prompt). Each is a maintenance surface.
- Renovate config is dense; consumers extending it past defaults need
  to learn its rules.
- Socket GitHub App requires a per-consumer install (one click); the
  CLI step in CI works regardless.
- Trace revalidation produces a steady stream of dashboard-issue
  updates that humans/agents must skim periodically. Most are
  no-action.
- ADR-022 + ADR-023 together are the repo's first amendment chain.
  Future agents must read both to get the current policy picture.
- Major-bump trigger means every semver-major Renovate PR blocks on
  agent walk-through of `evaluate-library` (~5 min agent work per
  major-bump per package).

**Neutral**

- The 6 amendments to ADR-022 don't change ADR-022's `Status: Accepted`.
  Future archaeology finds both ADRs and the implementation honors
  the composed picture.
- Existing 5 workflows are untouched except `ci.yml` gaining 1 step
  (`pnpm audit signatures`) and 1 step (`socket-cli scan`).
- Glossary entries for **Trace revalidation** and **Major-bump
  re-evaluation** landed inline during the grill session that produced
  this ADR.

## Related

- ADR-022 — Library evaluation policy (the foundation this builds on
  and amends in §6)
- ADR-019 — Sandcastle agent orchestration (the reviewer prompt is the
  agent-loop enforcement surface, see §7)
- ADR-021 — release-please versioning (Renovate's bump PRs interact
  with release-please's release PRs; both are managed automatically)
- ADR-012 — Feature conventions (the conformance system shape this
  stack mirrors — layered enforcement at declining latencies)
- ADR-017 — OpenTelemetry migration (vendor-isolation pattern; Socket
  integration follows the same shape — `core-shared` doesn't import
  Socket SDK)
- Glossary entries for **Library trace**, **Pre-shipped trace**,
  **Trace revalidation**, **Major-bump re-evaluation**
- PRD: `docs/work/prds/ci-security-and-supply-chain.prd.md`
  (to be written, materialized via `/to-prd`)
- Companion guide: `docs/guides/ci-security.md` (to be written; human
  reading-room with worked examples)
