The audit-logs collection was never registered (record() would throw),
bindAudit/createAuditErasureHook were unused, and DSR cascade-hard never
touched the audit trail (audit finding A6). core-cms now registers the
collection and wires a req-scoped afterDelete erasure hook on users;
bindAllProduction binds the audit log into consent/DSR; cascade-hard
pseudonymizes the subject's audit entries; the action select accepts
the full AuditAction enum so consent/DSR entries pass validation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The DSR walkers read the COLLECTION-level custom.pii map, which the
users collection never declared — Art. 15 export returned bare ids and
Art. 17 soft delete redacted nothing; the auth-injected email field in
particular was invisible (audit finding A5). Declares email (auto-added
by Payload auth: true), username and displayName as exportable +
restrictable; walker tests pin a users-shaped collection end to end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The retention purge job gated its whole body on activeRetention while
every collection declares only postDeletion, and no app ever called
registerRetentionPurgeJobs — retention was dead end to end (audit
findings A2 + A3). The DSR soft delete now stamps a deletedAt tombstone
on postDeletion collections (kept distinct from processingRestrictedAt
so an Art. 18 restriction never feeds the purge), the job grace-purges
tombstoned rows past postDeletion.duration with the declared action,
core-cms injects the tombstone field + Payload task definitions, and
bindAllProduction enqueues the first purge cycle at boot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The tRPC createContext was () => ({}) — the mounted dsr/consent routers
401'd every call and the dsr singleton stub threw (audit finding A11).
createTrpcContext now accepts an app resolveUser hook; web-next resolves
the session cookie through the auth feature's validateSession (denylist
included) plus a role snapshot, and threads bindProductionDsr/Consent
(or dev-seed) bindings into every request. The dsr router resolves its
binding from ctx.dsrBinding per request instead of a throwing proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Non-admin callers may export/rectify/restrict/delete ONLY their own
subjectId; a mismatch is rejected with FORBIDDEN instead of being
honored verbatim (IDOR, audit finding A1). Cross-subject operations
require the admin role; cascade-hard stays admin-only on top.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@trpc/client resolved to 11.16.0 in some packages while @trpc/server
resolved to 11.17.0 in others, tripping the exact-version peer check.
Update every @trpc/* range in-range so the whole workspace resolves to
one version (11.18.0); install is peer-warning-free again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pnpm audit --prod --audit-level=critical (the new CI gate) failed on
vitest <3.2.6 (critical, arbitrary file read/execute via the UI
server). Bump vitest + @vitest/coverage-v8 in-range across the
workspace and add @vitest/coverage-v8 to every package that runs
vitest but lacked it (core-audit, core-cms, core-eslint, core-testing,
core-trpc, apps/cms, web-next, web-tanstack, turbo/generators) so
'pnpm test -- --coverage' works in every package. No compound test
scripts exist, so the vitest-last pass-through concern does not apply.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add four protocol-agnostic handlers (export, delete, rectify, restrict)
returning normalized { status, body, headers } responses, and a tRPC
dsrRouter via createDsrRouter(binding) following the factory pattern.
Auth checks: requireAuthenticated middleware gates all four procedures;
cascade-hard delete additionally requires admin role. Integration tests
assert happy-path response shapes, UNAUTHORIZED/FORBIDDEN error codes,
and error passthrough from the DSR service layer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PayloadDataDelete.deleteSubjectData('soft') was NULLing PII fields and
emitting RESTRICT audit entries, but never setting processingRestrictedAt
on self-kind rows — violating GDPR Art. 17 restriction semantics.
softRedactOwnerRows now accepts optional extraData; processOwnerRows
passes { processingRestrictedAt: new Date().toISOString() } when
kind === 'self' and mode === 'soft'. Owner-kind rows are intentionally
excluded (restriction flag belongs on the subject record, not owned rows).
Added two dedicated tests: one asserting the field is present for self,
one asserting it is absent for owner.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
