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agentic-dev/docs/work/2026-05-14-ci-security-and-supply-chain/06-codeql-and-audit-signatures/_story.md
Danijel Martinek c17d3f147d chore(work): decompose 2026-05-14-ci-security-and-supply-chain epic 
Decomposer produced 9 stories under docs/work/2026-05-14-ci-
security-and-supply-chain/, ordered to land the schema foundation
first and the cross-referencing content (reviewer prompt, guide)
last:

01 - trace schema extensions (socketRisk + lastRevalidated)
02 - Socket integration (skill + CI)
03 - Renovate adoption
04 - major-bump re-evaluation flow
05 - trace revalidation workflow
06 - CodeQL + audit signatures
07 - gitleaks pre-commit
08 - reviewer prompt update
09 - CI security guide + docs

Also fixes a one-char status typo in the PRD frontmatter
(\`appoved\` -> \`approved\`) that landed with the decompose run.

Anchored by ADR-023 + the approved PRD at
docs/work/prds/2026-05-14-ci-security-and-supply-chain.prd.md.
Sequencing: depends on stories 01/02/04/06 of the in-flight
library-evaluation epic landing first.
2026-05-14 18:59:12 +02:00

2.5 KiB
Raw Blame History

id, epic, title, type, status, feature, depends-on, blocks
id epic title type status feature depends-on blocks
06-codeql-and-audit-signatures 2026-05-14-ci-security-and-supply-chain CodeQL workflow + pnpm audit signatures technical-story todo tooling
08-reviewer-prompt-update

Goal

Add two baseline GitHub-native gates: (1) a pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high step in ci.yml's validate job, and (2) a .github/workflows/codeql.yml workflow running javascript-typescript static analysis on push/PR/weekly schedule.

Why

pnpm audit signatures catches tampered package signatures before they reach production — a post-install script from a compromised maintainer account would fail this check. CodeQL's javascript-typescript analysis catches common vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, prototype pollution) that are invisible to dependency-scanning tools. Both are zero-cost on public repos and the GitHub Free plan; CodeQL's template includes a clear no-op on plans that don't support it.

Done when

  • ci.yml's validate job includes a pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high step. The step fails the job on high or critical severity signature failures.
  • .github/workflows/codeql.yml exists; triggers: push: branches: [main], pull_request, and schedule: - cron: "0 2 * * 3" (Wednesday 02:00 UTC, staggered from the trace-revalidation cron); language: javascript-typescript; uses default queries. Includes a comment noting that CodeQL on private repos requires GitHub Advanced Security (consumer-toggleable per PRD constraint).
  • pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm test && pnpm conformance && pnpm fallow:audit && pnpm coverage:diff all pass (no executable code change; CI config only).

In scope

  • .github/workflows/ci.yml — one new pnpm audit signatures step in validate job.
  • .github/workflows/codeql.yml — new workflow file.

Out of scope

  • Configuring GitHub branch protection to require CodeQL as a status check — consumer-facing instruction deferred to Story 09's guide.
  • OSSF Scorecard — explicitly out of PRD scope.
  • StepSecurity Harden Runner — explicitly out of PRD scope.

Tasks

  • Add pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high as a step in ci.yml's validate job; one commit, all gates pass.
  • Create .github/workflows/codeql.yml (language: javascript-typescript; triggers: push to main, pull_request, weekly schedule Wednesday 02:00 UTC; default queries; consumer note about GitHub Advanced Security requirement for private repos); one commit, all gates pass.