The previous layout placed epic folders directly under docs/work/
alongside prds/ and _system/. Tightening: epics now live in their
own docs/work/epics/ subfolder, peer to prds/ and _system/. Same
shape as the existing prds/ bucket.
Final docs/work/ layout:
README.md
prds/<slug>.prd.md
_system/_state.json
epics/<slug>/_epic.md + <story-folder>/_story.md
Renames (git mv preserves history):
- docs/work/binder-wrap-helper/
-> docs/work/epics/binder-wrap-helper/
- docs/work/library-evaluation-policy/
-> docs/work/epics/library-evaluation-policy/
- docs/work/ci-security-and-supply-chain/
-> docs/work/epics/ci-security-and-supply-chain/
Tooling updates:
- state-builder.mjs walks workRoot/epics/ directly; SKIP_FOLDERS
obsoleted (no more sibling folders to filter out).
- dispatch.mjs's findNextTask, tickStoryBulletInEpic, and
flipEpicDoneIfAllStoriesDone all join with "epics" segment.
- prd-ship.mjs's deriveShippingCommits walks workRoot/epics/ and
git-logs docs/work/epics/<epic>/.
- decomposer.prompt.md emits epics under docs/work/epics/<epic-id>/.
- handoff + grill-with-docs glossary references updated.
- Glossary entry for Epic updated.
Reserved future shape: when a task-tracker integration (ClickUp,
Linear) ships, the epics/ subfolder hosts <task-id>-<slug>/
folders. Today it just hosts bare slugs.
2.5 KiB
2.5 KiB
id, epic, title, type, status, feature, depends-on, blocks, created, updated
| id | epic | title | type | status | feature | depends-on | blocks | created | updated | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06-codeql-and-audit-signatures | ci-security-and-supply-chain | CodeQL workflow + pnpm audit signatures | technical-story | done | tooling |
|
2026-05-14T18:59:12+02:00 | 2026-05-14T19:21:52.308Z |
Goal
Add two baseline GitHub-native gates: (1) a pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high step in ci.yml's validate job, and (2) a .github/workflows/codeql.yml workflow running javascript-typescript static analysis on push/PR/weekly schedule.
Why
pnpm audit signatures catches tampered package signatures before they reach production — a post-install script from a compromised maintainer account would fail this check. CodeQL's javascript-typescript analysis catches common vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, prototype pollution) that are invisible to dependency-scanning tools. Both are zero-cost on public repos and the GitHub Free plan; CodeQL's template includes a clear no-op on plans that don't support it.
Done when
ci.yml'svalidatejob includes apnpm audit signatures --audit-level=highstep. The step fails the job onhighorcriticalseverity signature failures..github/workflows/codeql.ymlexists; triggers:push: branches: [main],pull_request, andschedule: - cron: "0 2 * * 3"(Wednesday 02:00 UTC, staggered from the trace-revalidation cron); language:javascript-typescript; uses default queries. Includes a comment noting that CodeQL on private repos requires GitHub Advanced Security (consumer-toggleable per PRD constraint).pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm test && pnpm conformance && pnpm fallow:audit && pnpm coverage:diffall pass (no executable code change; CI config only).
In scope
.github/workflows/ci.yml— one newpnpm audit signaturesstep invalidatejob..github/workflows/codeql.yml— new workflow file.
Out of scope
- Configuring GitHub branch protection to require CodeQL as a status check — consumer-facing instruction deferred to Story 09's guide.
- OSSF Scorecard — explicitly out of PRD scope.
- StepSecurity Harden Runner — explicitly out of PRD scope.
Tasks
- Add
pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=highas a step inci.yml'svalidatejob; one commit, all gates pass. - Create
.github/workflows/codeql.yml(language:javascript-typescript; triggers: push to main, pull_request, weekly schedule Wednesday 02:00 UTC; default queries; consumer note about GitHub Advanced Security requirement for private repos); one commit, all gates pass.