Files
Danijel Martinek 90fc2853f2 feat(work): add ISO timestamps + auto-bump on staged work-doc changes
- New scripts/work/bump-updated-timestamps.mjs stamps the `updated:`
  frontmatter field to the current ISO 8601 UTC timestamp on every
  staged docs/work/**/*.md file. Idempotent; adds the field after
  `created:` if missing.
- .husky/pre-commit invokes the bump script as step 2 (before
  rebuild-state) so _state.json sees the fresh timestamp.
- Backfill all existing work docs (4 PRDs + 3 epics + 21 stories):
    * created: promoted from \`YYYY-MM-DD\` -> ISO timestamp using
      git log --diff-filter=A on each file (first-commit date for
      stories that had no \`created:\` line, midnight UTC for PRDs
      and epics that had date-only created).
    * updated: added from \`git log -1 --format=%aI\` on each file
      (last-commit timestamp); will be re-stamped to "now" by the
      pre-commit hook on this commit.

Stories that had no \`created:\` line now get one.
2026-05-14 21:10:34 +02:00

2.5 KiB

id, epic, title, type, status, feature, depends-on, blocks, created, updated
id epic title type status feature depends-on blocks created updated
06-codeql-and-audit-signatures 2026-05-14-ci-security-and-supply-chain CodeQL workflow + pnpm audit signatures technical-story done tooling
08-reviewer-prompt-update
2026-05-14T18:59:12+02:00 2026-05-14T19:10:35.370Z

Goal

Add two baseline GitHub-native gates: (1) a pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high step in ci.yml's validate job, and (2) a .github/workflows/codeql.yml workflow running javascript-typescript static analysis on push/PR/weekly schedule.

Why

pnpm audit signatures catches tampered package signatures before they reach production — a post-install script from a compromised maintainer account would fail this check. CodeQL's javascript-typescript analysis catches common vulnerability patterns (XSS, injection, prototype pollution) that are invisible to dependency-scanning tools. Both are zero-cost on public repos and the GitHub Free plan; CodeQL's template includes a clear no-op on plans that don't support it.

Done when

  • ci.yml's validate job includes a pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high step. The step fails the job on high or critical severity signature failures.
  • .github/workflows/codeql.yml exists; triggers: push: branches: [main], pull_request, and schedule: - cron: "0 2 * * 3" (Wednesday 02:00 UTC, staggered from the trace-revalidation cron); language: javascript-typescript; uses default queries. Includes a comment noting that CodeQL on private repos requires GitHub Advanced Security (consumer-toggleable per PRD constraint).
  • pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint && pnpm test && pnpm conformance && pnpm fallow:audit && pnpm coverage:diff all pass (no executable code change; CI config only).

In scope

  • .github/workflows/ci.yml — one new pnpm audit signatures step in validate job.
  • .github/workflows/codeql.yml — new workflow file.

Out of scope

  • Configuring GitHub branch protection to require CodeQL as a status check — consumer-facing instruction deferred to Story 09's guide.
  • OSSF Scorecard — explicitly out of PRD scope.
  • StepSecurity Harden Runner — explicitly out of PRD scope.

Tasks

  • Add pnpm audit signatures --audit-level=high as a step in ci.yml's validate job; one commit, all gates pass.
  • Create .github/workflows/codeql.yml (language: javascript-typescript; triggers: push to main, pull_request, weekly schedule Wednesday 02:00 UTC; default queries; consumer note about GitHub Advanced Security requirement for private repos); one commit, all gates pass.